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1Abstract
In this paper we ¯rst explore the predictive power of the solution no-
tion called conservative stable standard of behaviour (CSSB), introduced by
Greenberg (1990) in environments with farsighted players (as modelled in
Xue (1998)) as intuitively it is quite nice. Unfortunately, we ¯nd that CSSB
has a number of undesirable properties. Therefore, we introduce a re¯ne-
ment of this which we call conservative stable weak predictor. We explore
some existence properties of this new solution.
JEL Classi¯cation Number: C70, C71, C72.
Keywords: Coalitions; stable behaviour; perfect foresight.
1 Introduction
The seminal work of Chwe (1994) analyzing coalitional behaviour in a general so-
cial environment with players having perfect foresight gave rise to a number of
subsequent works. After analyzing the properties of the largest consistent set, the
solution notion he introduced, Chwe listed several issues of coalitional behaviour
with farsighted players that his solution concept failed to capture. Some of the
subsequent literature took up and addressed these problems (at times with dras-
tically di®erent modelling also) with new solution ideas in the set-up of general
social environment itself (e.g., Xue (1998), Konishi and Ray (2003), Herings et al.
(2004)) and some of these studied speci¯c environments (like Ambrus (2006) in the
environment of games in normal form, Bhattacharya (2002) in the environment of
voting situations with ¯nite number of outcomes, Duggan and Kalandrakis (2008)
and Penn (2009) in the environment of spatial voting situations etc).
One of the most popular ones among these is Xue (1998). In his attempt to im-
prove upon the concept of the largest consistent set (LCS) he correctly recognized
that
2...the inclusiveness of the LCS...stem[s] from the fact that indirect
dominance de¯ned on Z [the set of outcomes] fails to capture perfect
foresight since it ignores the possible deviation along the way from one
alternative (e.g., a) to another (e.g., d).
So, he tried to incorporate a \credibility" restriction on a coalition's deviations from
an outcome. Since the sequence of possible moves by the di®erent coalitions can
be of arbitrary length, the framework of social situations developed by Greenberg
(1990) turned out to be quite useful for his analyses. He obtained his notion of
coalitional stability through the concept of a stable standard of behaviour. We
consider this idea quite nice and we agree that the CSSB applied to the situation
with perfect foresight is an intuitively appealing stability notion.
Toward the end of his paper Xue says that
In his concluding remarks Chwe recognizes several issues that the
notion of LCS fails to address, yet no constructive solution was o®ered.
The notion suggested in this paper resolves most if not all of these
issues.
In this paper we start with further examining the usefulness of his idea for di®er-
ent environments. However, we ¯nd that unfortunately, in a large class of social
environments representable by games in e®ectivity function form, CSSB has no
predictive power at all if every path is feasible. This is a serious drawback of the
solution concept because this subclass contains very common environments like
normal form games, voting situations, games in characteristic function form, social
networks (as in the framework of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996)) etc. Furthermore,
in Theorem 4.5 of his paper Xue compares CSSB with the LCS and shows that un-
der some assumptions, his stability notion re¯nes the LCS. However, we ¯nd that
with a somewhat similar, but logically more consistent restriction of feasibility on
paths, the reverse is true for a class of social environments which includes the class
of voting games with a ¯nite number of outcomes.
3Next, we reckon that the failure of CSSB as a predictor may stem from the fact
that Xue, following Greenberg, used a \strong" form of domination. Therefore, we
weaken the notion of dominance while retaining the main idea behind CSSB. We
call the resulting solution conservative stable weak predictor (CSWP). We study
some properties of this modi¯ed solution in the environment of voting and ¯nd that
even with this modi¯cation the solution does not have nice existence properties.
The following section gives the preliminary de¯nitions and remarks. We study
the further properties of CSSB and its problematic features in Section 3. Next we
study the properties of CSWP in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Preliminary De¯nitions and Remarks
We would follow almost all of Xue's de¯nitions and notation.
A social environment is represented by G = (N; Z; f¹igi2N; f!
S
gSµN): Here
N is the ¯nite set of players, Z is the set of social states or outcomes, ¹i is the
preference relation for i 2 N on Z and !
S
is the e®ectivity relation for S µ N. For
each i 2 N; a¹ib means that player i weakly prefers outcome b to outcome a: The
strict part of ¹i is denoted by Ái :2 Thus, for every i 2 N; Ái is irre°exive on Z:
For any a; b 2 Z; a !
S
b implies that the coalition S can enforce outcome b from
outcome a: A number of examples of the games that can be written in this form is
provided by Chwe (1994) and Xue (1998).
Definition 1 Given a social environment G; a path3 is a singleton sequence of
the form fa1g or an ordered sequence of the form fa1; S1; a2; S2;:::; Sk¡1; akg
2In Xue's speci¯cation, the individual preferences are assumed to be strict but the results
following do not change with this added restriction.
3Here we have slightly modi¯ed Xue's de¯nition of a path. In our de¯nition of a path, we also
specify the coalitions which enforce one outcome from another along the path. This is similar to
the de¯nition of history given in Herings et al. (2004).
4where for each i; ai 2 Z; Si µ N and for every j = 1;:::;k ¡ 1; aj !
Sj
aj+1:
If an outcome a 2 Z lies on a path ® then that is denoted as a 2 ®: The
set ¦ denotes the set of all possible paths. For a 2 Z; ¦a denotes the set of all
possible paths that originate from a; i.e., the possible paths which have a as the
¯rst element. Below, some time we shall impose a feasibility restriction and con-
sider the set of feasible paths only instead of considering all possible paths. The
set of feasible paths is generically denoted by ¦f: For a 2 Z; ¦f
a denotes the set
of all feasible paths that originate from a including fag itself. For a path ®; t(®)
denotes its terminal outcome. Individual preferences are extended on ¦ as follows.
For i 2 N and for any two paths ® and ¯; ® ¹i ¯ if and only if t(®) ¹i t(¯)
(and similarly for Ái). This implies that for a sequence of coalitional moves de-
scribed by a path, the players receive the pay-o®s corresponding to the terminal
element of the path. For some coalition S and a; b 2 Z; if a Ái b for all i 2 S
then that is written as a ÁS b and if such a coalition exists, then we also write
a Á b: Similarly, for paths ® and ¯, if t(®) ÁS t(¯) then it is also written as ® ÁS ¯:
Definition 2 Suppose ¦f is given as the set of feasible paths for environment G:
A standard of behaviour4 (SB) ¾ is a map, ¾ : Z 7! ¦f such that for every a 2 Z;
¾(a) µ ¦f
a:
Definition 3 Suppose ¦f is given as the set of feasible paths for environment G:
An SB ¾ is:
(i) A conservative internally stable standard of behaviour (CISSB) for G if for all
a 2 Z; ® 2 ¾(a) =) there do not exist S µ N; b 2 ® and c 2 Z such that
fb; S; cg 2 ¦
f
b; ¾(c) 6= ; and ® ÁS ¯ for all ¯ 2 ¾(c);
4The general framework of Greenberg (1990) uses concepts like positions, situations, induce-
ment correspondences etc.. A rigorous recasting of the present set-up into Greenberg's framework
can be made following Mariotti and Xue (2003).
5(ii) A conservative externally stable standard of behaviour (CESSB) for G if for
all a 2 Z; ® 2 ¦f
a n ¾(a) =) there exist S µ N; b 2 ® and c 2 Z such that
fb; S; cg 2 ¦
f
b; ¾(c) 6= ; and ® ÁS ¯ for all ¯ 2 ¾(c):
An SB ¾ is a conservative stable standard of behaviour (CSSB) for G if it is
both a CISSB and a CESSB.
Therefore, for an outcome x 2 Z; a CSSB speci¯es the set of \credible" paths
from x: The underlying idea is that if a coalition makes a feasible deviation from
an outcome x to an outcome y then, being farsighted, the players in the coali-
tion examine all the \credible" paths that originate from y: A feasible path is not
\credible" if some coalition can feasibly deviate from it to another outcome and
if its members are strictly better-o® at every credible path originating from that
outcome. Thus, the intuition behind CSSB is quite appealing.
The corresponding set of stable outcomes is de¯ned as follows.
Definition 4 (Xue (1998)) Given an environment G; a set X µ Z is said to be
a set of stable outcomes under conservatism or Xue-stable if there exists a CSSB
¾ for G such that X = fa 2 Zj fag 2 ¾(a)g:
Given an environment G; a CSSB ¾ is said to be non-empty valued if for every
a 2 Z; ¾(a) 6= ;: Naturally, a stable standard of behaviour should be non-empty
valued if it is to make predictions about coalitional behaviour.
3 Further Properties of CSSB and Some of its
Problems
In this section, ¯rst we show that if every path is feasible, then CSSB has no pre-
dictive power at all for a large class of environments.
6Let us specify the following condition.
Condition C: An environment G satis¯es Condition C if for every pair (a;b) 2
Z £ Z; there exists a path ® 2 ¦a such that t(®) = b:
That is, an environment G satis¯es Condition C if for any two outcomes in Z;
there exists a path between them.
A large class of environments satis¯es this condition; e.g., games in normal
form, voting games, games in characteristic function form, social networks5 (as in
the framework of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996)) etc.
Theorem 1 Suppose an environment G satis¯es Condition C and let ¦f be ¦ (i.e.,
every path is feasible). Then, the following SB ¾ is a CSSB:
for every a 2 Z; ¾(a) = ¦a:
Therefore, in this case, the entire Z is a Xue-stable set.
Proof: It su±ces to show that ¾ as speci¯ed in the theorem is conservative inter-
nally stable. Suppose otherwise. Then, there exist a 2 Z and ® 2 ¦a for which
the following is true:
(y) for some b 2 ®; there exist S µ N; and c 2 Z such that fb; S; cg 2 ¦b;
¦(c) 6= ; and ® ÁS ¯ for every ¯ 2 ¦(c):
Therefore, by Condition C, for some ¯ 2 ¾(c); t(¯) = t(®) and by irre°exivity
of Ái; (y) can never hold.
5In the appendix we have described how the environment of social networks falls within the
present formalism.
7Remark 1 Xue has given some examples of environments where CSSB makes
some non-trivial predictions. For example, see the game in Figure 2 of Xue (1998)
given below. The unique CSSB for this environment is given by ¾(b) = fb;f2g;cg
and ¾(a) = fag;¾(c) = fcg and ¾(d) = fdg: Therefore, for this environment the
unique Xue-stable set is: fa;c;dg:
a(6;0)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . f1g
b(7;4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . f1,2g
d(10;5)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
c(5;10) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . f2g
Note, however, that such environments do not satisfy Condition C: For example,
in this game no outcome can be enforced from outcome c and outcome d:
Remark 2 Recall that the underlying idea behind CSSB is that if a coalition S
makes a feasible deviation from an outcome x to an outcome y then, being far-
sighted, the players in S examine all the \credible" paths that originate from y:
A feasible path is not \credible" if some coalition can feasibly deviate from it to
another outcome and if its members are strictly better-o® at every credible path
originating from that outcome. Now, this may be too demanding and this seems
to be the reason behind the inclusiveness of CSSB. One interesting direction of
further study is to relax the requirement of domination in the following way: a
feasible path is not \credible" if some coalition can feasibly deviate from it to
another outcome and if its members are weakly better-o® at every credible path
originating from that outcome and strictly better-o® at least for one path. We look
at the implications of this modi¯cation in the next section.
Next, we state another condition.
8Condition C0: An environment G satis¯es Condition C0 if the following holds. For
S µ N; if there exist (a;b) 2 Z £Z; such that a !
S




This condition is obeyed by simple games or voting games which we de¯ne be-
low (see, e.g., Peleg (1984)).
Definition 5 The social environment G is a simple game if there exists a non-
empty set B ½ 2N called the set of winning coalitions such that
(i) T 2 B; S ¶ T =) S 2 B:
(ii) If S 2 B then for any a;b 2 Z; a !
S
b and if S 62 B then for no two a;b 2 Z
is it the case that a !
S
b:
Below we recapitulate a few concepts which will be useful.
Definition 6 (Chwe (1994)) For a; b 2 Z; b indirectly dominates a; denoted as
a ¿ b, if there exist a0; a1;:::; am in Z and coalitions S0; S1;:::; Sm¡1 such




(ii) aj ÁSj am:
Definition 7 (Chwe (1994)) A set Y µ Z is said to be consistent if Y = fa 2
Zj 8(S; d) 2 (2N £ Z) for which a !
S
d; 9 e 2 Y such that [e = d or d ¿ e]
and a 6ÁS eg: The set L µ Z is said to be the largest consistent set (LCS) if it is
consistent and it contains every consistent set.6
For our subsequent discussion, we restrict the set of feasible paths as follows.
6Chwe (1994) showed that LCS exists for every environment.
9Definition 8 For a1 2 Z; take a path ® 2 ¦a1 such that ® = fa1; S1;:::; Sk¡1; akg:
The path ® is feasible by domination only if for every j = 1;:::;k ¡ 1; aj ÁSj ak:
Additionally, we assume that every singleton path is feasible by domination.
Therefore, a non-singleton path from an outcome a is feasible only if the ter-
minal element of this path indirectly dominates a along the path. Xue imposed a
somewhat similar feasibility restriction 7 in Theorem 4.5 of his paper for comparing
CSSB with the LCS. He showed that under such a restriction, his stability notion
re¯nes the LCS. However, we show the following.
Theorem 2 Take a social environment G for which L 6= ;8 and which satis¯es
Condition C0: Let ¦f be the set of paths feasible by domination. Then, G has some
Xue-stable set X such that L µ X: Moreover, there are some environments for
which this inclusion is strict.
To prove this theorem we ¯rst note the following lemmata.
Lemma 2.1 Suppose for an environment G; L 6= ; and Condition C0 holds. Then,
a 2 Z n L implies that there exists b 2 L such that a ¿ b:
Proof: Suppose L 6= ; and a 2 Z n L: Then, by the de¯nition of L; there exist
(S; d) 2 (2N £ Z) for which a !
S
d: Suppose that for no b 2 L is it true that
a ¿ b: Take any b 2 L and consider the pair (S;a): By C0; b !
S
a: Since a 62 L and
fe 2 Lj a ¿ eg = ;; L cannot be consistent. But this is a contradiction.
Lemma 2.2 Suppose there exists a CISSB ¾ for an environment G such that for
7In Remark 3 below we explain the logical problems of Xue's restrictions which we try to
improve here.
8This is ensured under quite weak conditions (see, e.g., Chwe (1994), Xue (1997)). For exam-
ple, every environment for which Z is ¯nite admits a non-empty LCS.
10every a 2 Z; ¾(a) 6= ;: Then there exists a CSSB ¾0 for G such that for every
a 2 Z; ¾(a) µ ¾0(a):
Proof: The proof is exactly similar to that of Theorem 3.4 in Greenberg et al.
(1996).
Proof of Theorem 2: (i) Take an environment G for which L 6= ; and which
satis¯es Condition C0: Consider an SB ¾ as follows:
for every a 2 Z; ¾(a) = f® 2 ¦f
aj t(®) 2 Lg:
By Lemma 2.1, for every a 2 Z; ¾(a) 6= ;:
Next we show that ¾ as de¯ned above is conservative internally stable. Sup-
pose otherwise. Then there exist a 2 Z and ® 2 ¾(a) for which the following is
true:
(z) for some b 2 ®; there exist S µ N and c 2 Z such that fb; S; cg 2 ¦
f
b; ¾(c) 6= ;
and ® ÁS ¯ for all ¯ 2 ¾(c):
Now, consider the pair (S;c) with respect to t(®): By C0; t(®) !
S
c and by (z)
for every e 2 L; e = c or c ¿ e implies that t(®) ÁS e: But then by the de¯nition of
LCS, t(®) 62 L which is a contradiction. Therefore, ¾ as de¯ned above is conserva-
tive internally stable. Then, by Lemma 2.2, there exists a CSSB ¾0 for G such that
for every a 2 Z; ¾(a) µ ¾0(a): De¯ne the Xue-stable set X = fa 2 Zj fag 2 ¾0(a)g:
Then, L µ X:
(ii) For proving the second part of the theorem, take the following proper 9 simple
game, G:
N = f1; :::; 7g; Z = fa;b;c;d;e;fg: Let the set of minimal winning coalitions
be W = fS1; :::; S4g where
S1 = f1;2;3g; S2 = f1;4;5g; S3 = f2;4;6g; S4 = f3;5;6;7g:
9A simple game (see De¯nition 5) is said to be proper if for every S 2 B; (N n S) = 2 B:
11The players' preferences over Z are the following:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
d e b a d b c
c d f e f f d
b c c c c a a
f a d d b e f
a f a f e c e
e b e b a d b
This implies the following relations:
a ÁS1 c; a ÁS1 d; f ÁS2 d; b ÁS2 c; b ÁS2 d; c ÁS3 e; d ÁS3 e; e ÁS4 f:
It is easily checked that for no other x;y 2 Z and S 2 W is it true that x ÁS y:
This environment satis¯es the condition C0: Let ¦f be the set of paths feasible
by domination.
In this framework the de¯nition of a consistent set can be simpli¯ed as follows
(Bhattacharya (2002)): a set Y µ Z is said to be consistent if Y = fa 2 Zj 8(S; d)
2 (W £ Z), 9 e 2 Y such that [e = d or d Á e] and a 6 ÁSeg: Then routine com-
putation (see Chwe (1994)) yields that the LCS, L; for this game is fc;d;e;fg:
However, Z is a Xue-stable set for this game. To see this, construct an SB ¾ such
that for every x 2 Z; ¾(x) = f® 2 ¦f
xj t(®) 2 Lg: By Lemma 2.2, there exists a
CSSB ¾0 for G such that for every a 2 Z; ¾(a) µ ¾0(a): We claim that a 2 ¾0(a):
Suppose otherwise. Then there exist S 2 W and x 2 Z such that fa; S; xg 2 ¦f
a;
¾0(x) 6= ; and a ÁS t(¯) for all ¯ 2 ¾0(x): Check that fa; S; xg is either fa; S1; cg
or fa; S1; dg: But note that fc; S3; eg 2 ¾0(c) and fd; S3; eg 2 ¾0(d): Since it
is not the case that a ÁS1 e; the claim is proved. Similarly it can be shown that
b 2 ¾0(b):
We obtain the following corollary from the proof of Theorem 2 which may be
12of independent interest, especially for voting situations.
Corollary 1 Take a social environment G for which L 6= ; and which satis¯es
Condition C0: Let ¦f be the set of paths feasible by domination. Then, G has a
non-empty valued largest CSSB.
Remark 3 In this remark we point out a few conceptual drawbacks of the feasi-
bility restriction of Xue which we wanted to remove in our feasibility restriction.
First, Xue merely requires that for a non-singleton path to be feasible, the terminal
element should indirectly dominate the ¯rst element of the path but not necessarily
along the path. Secondly, he does not impose this restriction on the entire set of
paths but only on those in a non-empty valued CSSB. However, even with Xue's
restriction it can be shown that for every environment we studied in Theorem 2,
the LCS is contained in some Xue-stable set. However, the strict inclusion would
not be true.
Remark 4 Theorem 2 shows that CSSB cannot re¯ne the LCS in an important
class of environments. However, in such environments the LCS itself su®ers from
a shortcoming. For the class of simple games with a ¯nite number of outcomes,
the LCS contains elements that are stable owing to only incredible coalitional de-
viations (Bhattacharya (2002)).
An immediate question is that whether we can obtain a result like Corollary 1
if we replace the Condition C0 by Condition C. In other words, if the set of feasible
paths is restricted to be the set of paths set of paths feasible by domination, then
can we ensure that a non-empty valued CSSB exists for every social environment?
The answer is negative.
13Theorem 3 There exists a social environment G for which L 6= ;; which satis¯es
Condition C and for which we take ¦f to be the set of paths feasible by domination.
However, the unique CSSB for G is not non-empty valued.
Proof: Take the following environment (somewhat similar to Figure 4 in Xue
(1998)) N = f1;2g: Z = fa;b;cg: The players' preferences on Z are given as fol-
lows.
c Á1 a Á1 b and b Á2 a Á2 c:
























This environment satis¯es C.
Note that x Á1 b for every x 2 Z n fbg: Since 1 2 S for every (S;x) 2 2N £ Z
such that b !
S
x; the only feasible path from b is fbg only. Similarly, note that
x Á2 c for every x 2 Z n fcg: Again, since 2 2 S for every (S;x) 2 2N £ Z such
that c !
S
x; the only feasible path from c is fcg: Now, by using a similar reason-
ing as above, it can be checked that there are three feasible paths in ¦f
a; namely,
fag; fa;f1g;bg and fa;f2g;cg: Let ¾ be any CSSB for this environment. By def-
inition of a CSSB, ¾(b) = fbg and ¾(c) = fcg: Now take, for example, the path
fa;f1g;bg from a: Consider the outcome a on this path. Then, fa; f2g; cg 2 ¦f
a;
¾(c) 6= ; and b Á2 c: Therefore, the path fa;f1g;bg cannot be in ¾(a): By using a
similar reasoning for the other two paths, it can be shown that ¾(a) = ;:
144 Conservative Stability with Weak Dominance
Recall Remark 2 above where we noted that the underlying idea behind CSSB is
that if a coalition S makes a feasible deviation from an outcome x to an outcome
y then, being farsighted, the players in S examine all the \credible" paths that
originate from y: A feasible path is not \credible" if and only if some coalition can
feasibly deviate from it to another outcome and if its members are strictly better-
o® at every credible path originating from that outcome. Now, we noted that this
may be too demanding and this may be the reason behind the inclusiveness of
CSSB. In particular, note that under Condition C, starting from any path with a
terminal element a (say) we can reach a again and since an outcome cannot be
strictly dominated by itself, the result follows. Below we relax the requirement of
domination in the following way: a feasible path is not \credible" if and only if
some coalition can feasibly deviate from it to another outcome and if its members
are weakly better-o® at every credible path originating from that outcome and
strictly better-o® at least for one path. Below we express this idea formally.
For some coalition S and a; b 2 Z; if a ¹i b for all i 2 S then that is written as
a ¹S b. Similarly, for paths ® and ¯, if t(®) ¹S t(¯) then it is also written as
® ¹S ¯:
Then, the de¯nition of the set of stable paths is altered as follows.
Definition 9 Suppose ¦f is given as the set of feasible paths for environment G:
An SB ¾ is:
(i) A conservative internally stable weak predictor (CISWP) for G if for all a 2 Z;
® 2 ¾(a) =) there do not exist S µ N; b 2 ® and c 2 Z such that fb; S; cg 2 ¦
f
b;
¾(c) 6= ; and ® ¹S ¯ for all ¯ 2 ¾(c) with ® ÁS ¯ for at least one ¯ 2 ¾(c):
(ii) A conservative externally stable weak predictor (CESWP) for G if for all a 2 Z;
® 2 ¦f
a n ¾(a) =) there exist S µ N; b 2 ® and c 2 Z such that fb; S; cg 2 ¦
f
b;
¾(c) 6= ; and ® ¹S ¯ for all ¯ 2 ¾(c) with ® ÁS ¯ for at least one ¯ 2 ¾(c):
15An SB ¾ is a conservative stable weak predictor (CSWP) for G if it is both a
CISWP and a CESWP.
Notice that an inclusive result like Theorem 1 will no more hold in general with
this stability notion. Also, as we should expect, CSWP can give more precise pre-
diction than CSSB. In Theorem 4 below we show that a non-empty valued CSWP
re¯nes at least one (and thus the largest) non-empty valued CSSB in a precise sense.
Theorem 4 Suppose ¾ is a non-empty valued CSWP for an environment G: Then
there exists a non-empty valued CSSB ¾0 such that for every a 2 Z; ¾(a) µ ¾0(a):
Proof: Note that since ¾ is a CSWP, it is a CISWP. Therefore, by the de¯nitions
of CISWP (De¯nition 9) and that of a CISSB (De¯nition 3), ¾ is a non-empty
valued CISSB. Then, by Lemma 2.2, there exists a CSSB ¾0 for G such that for
every a 2 Z; ¾(a) µ ¾0(a):
Below we study some results concerning the existence of the above solution
concept for proper voting games with the assumption that every path is feasible.
Recall that a voting game (see De¯nition 5 above) is said to be proper if T 2 B
implies (N n T) = 2 B:
Theorem 5 Suppose G is a proper voting game.
(i) Suppose Z is ¯nite. Also suppose that for every pair a;b 2 Z; with a 6= b and
every winning coalition S; either a ÁS b or b ÁS a.10 Then G has a non-empty
valued CSWP.
(ii) Suppose Z is in¯nite. Then a non-empty valued CSWP may not exist.
(iii)Even if Z is ¯nite, but the myopic dominance relation, Á; is not total on Z;
10This is true, for example, for majority voting situations with an odd number of players when
each player has strict preferences.
16then a non-empty valued CSWP may not exist.
Proof: (i) Construct the following sets recursively.
Step 1: Let Z0 = Z: Pick, if possible, x0 2 Z0 such that there exists a winning
coalition S for which x0 ¹S z for every z 2 Z0 and x0 ÁS z for at least one z 2 Z0:
Construct Z1 = Z0 n fx0g:
Step m + 1: Take Zm: Pick, if possible, xm 2 Zm such that there exists a winning
coalition S for which xm ¹S z for every z 2 Zm and xm ÁS z for at least one
z 2 Zm: Construct Zm+1 = Zm n fxmg:
Since Z is ¯nite there exists a ¹ Z µ Z such that Zr = Zr+1 = ¢¢¢ = ¹ Z:
Consider an SB ¾ as follows:
for every a 2 Z; ¾(a) = f® 2 ¦aj t(®) 2 ¹ Zg:
By our construction of ¹ Z and the assumption that for every pair a;b 2 Z; with
a 6= b and every winning coalition S; either a ÁS b or b ÁS a; it is obvious that
¾(:); as speci¯ed above, is a CSWP.
(ii) Let G be the majority voting situation (i.e., a proper voting game where ev-
ery majority coalition is winning) with Z = I; the set of positive integers. For
each player i; the preference ordering over Z is as follows: a Ái b if and only if
a < b: (This example is the one used by Rubinstein (1980) for showing the possible
emptiness of the stability set with in¯nitely many outcomes).
Although it is obvious that no non-empty valued CSWP exists for this situation,
we give a short proof for completeness. Suppose not and let ¾ be a non-empty
valued CSWP for this environment. Note that if for every a 2 Z; the set of ter-
minal outcomes for the paths in ¾(a) is ¯nite, then ¾ cannot be a CESWP and
the contradiction is immediate. Therefore, suppose a be an outcome for which
the set of terminal outcomes for the paths in ¾(a) is in¯nite. Let b 2 Z be such
that b = t(®) for some ® 2 ¾(a) and for every c 2 Z such that c = t(®) for some
17® 2 ¾(a); b < c: Since b = t(®) for some ® 2 ¾(a); the singleton path fbg must
be in ¾(b): However, consider the move from b to a by the whole set of players N:
Since, by the de¯nition of b; every player in N strictly prefers every c 2 Z such
that c = t(®) for some ® 2 ¾(a); this violates the assumption that ¾ is a CISWP.
(iii) Consider the following majority rule voting game: N = f1;2;3g; Z = fa;b;cg:
The players' preferences over Z are the following:
1 2 3
b c a » c
a » c b b
a
(By the entry a » c under column i in the table above we imply that the player i
is indi®erent between outcome a and outcome c:)
Let S1 = f1;2g;S2 = f2;3g;S3 = f1;3g:
Suppose ¾ is a CSWP for this environment. We show below that it cannot be
non-empty valued. We take the following steps.
Step 1: First we note the following fact. For some x 2 Z; y = t(®) for some
® 2 ¾(x) if and only if the singleton path fyg 2 ¾(y). The proof of this fact is
exactly similar to that of Lemma 3.5 in Xue (1998) and additionally uses the fact
that for a majority rule voting game, any majority coalition can enforce any social
state from any other social state.
Step 2: Since for no majority coalition S and x 2 Z; is it true that c ÁS x;
fcg 2 ¾(c): Now suppose fbg = 2 ¾(b): We show that this leads to a contradic-
tion. With the assumption fbg = 2 ¾(b); since a 6ÁS c for any majority coalition
S; fag 2 ¾(a): Therefore, by Step 1, for every x 2 Z; every path starting with x
and ending with a must be in ¾(x): Now consider the path fbg: Since, for no ma-
18jority S is it true that b ¹S a; fbg must be in ¾(b): This is the desired contradiction.
Step 3: So, fbg 2 ¾(b): However, by considering the path fb;S2;cg we ¯nd that
fag must be in ¾(a) as, otherwise, fbg = 2 ¾(b): This implies every possible path
is in ¾(b): But then consider the path fa;S1;bg: By this deviation it is seen that
fag = 2 ¾(a): This leads to a contradiction.
Therefore, although CSWP can re¯ne CSSB, it does not have nice existence prop-
erties.
5 Conclusion
In this work ¯rst we tried to explore some properties, especially in regard to the
predictive power, of CSSB in situations with perfect foresight as we considered the
idea behind this solution to be intuitively quite nice for such situations. However,
we found that the predictive power of this solution is somewhat disappointing;
it may be too inclusive. Then we proposed a reasonable re¯nement of this idea.
However, then we ¯nd that this modi¯ed solution fail to be non-empty valued
in reasonably common situations. Thus, to conclude, the solution idea, while
intuitively nice, may not be quite useful.
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216 Appendix: Social Networks (Jackson and Wolin-
sky (1996)) in the Present Framework
Let N be the ¯nite set of players and let gN be the set of all doubleton subsets
of N: A bilateral network g is a subset of gN: Then, Z = faj a µ gNg: Given a
non-empty network g 2 Z; an element fi;jg 2 g (where i;j 2 N) is a link between
players i and j in the network g: A value function v : Z 7! R assigns a real value
to every network and the set of all value functions are denoted by V: Given a value
function v 2 V; an allocation rule Y : Z£V 7! RN allocates the value of a network
to the players. Given a value function v 2 V; an allocation rule Y : Z £ V 7! RN
induces a preference ordering ¹i (v;Y ) for each i 2 N on Z given as follows:
for a;b 2 Z; a ¹i (v;Y )b if and only if Yi(a;v) · Yi(b;v) and
for a;b 2 Z; a Ái (v;Y )b if and only if Yi(a;v) < Yi(b;v):
Given a pro¯le of players' preferences f¹igi2N; we assume that it has been induced
by some underlying value function and allocation rule.
The coalitional e®ectivity relation is speci¯ed as follows.
Definition 10 (Jackson and van den Nouweland (2005)) For a;b 2 Z; and S µ
N; a !
S
b if and only if
(i) a link fi;jg 2 b n a implies that fi;jg µ S and
(ii) a link fi;jg 2 a n b implies that fi;jg \ S 6= ;:
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